Introduction
On 16 September 2025, Sheldon J handed down judgment in Mazur and Stuart v Charles Russell Speechlys LLP [2025] EWHC 2341 (KB). In a decision which threatens to have a disruptive impact on the running of solicitors’ firms across the country, Sheldon J found that unqualified fee-earners, even when under the supervision of qualified persons, do not have the right to conduct litigation. In this article, we explain the context, reasoning and possible ramifications of the Mazur judgment.
What gave rise to the Mazur case?
The humble beginnings of this dispute stand in stark contrast to the potentially wide-ranging effects of the judgment to which it has given rise. The Respondent (“CRS”), a law firm, carried out legal work for the Appellants, Ms Mazur and Mr Stuart, the fee for which – £54,263.50 – went unpaid. A second law firm, Goldsmith Bowers Solicitors (“GBS”), was instructed to recover the debt. GBS’ “Head of Commercial Litigation” Peter Middleton, signed the Claim Form and the Particulars of Claim.
The Appellants challenged Mr Middleton’s entitlement to conduct litigation against them, in light of the fact that he lacked a current practising certificate. The proceedings were stayed by Deputy District Judge Campbell on this basis. CRS made an application to lift the stay which subsequently came before His Honour Judge Simpkiss. In the intervening period, the matter was referred to the SRA by one of GBS’ directors, Robert Ashall. On 2 December 2024, the SRA decided not to investigate GBS or Mr Middleton (the “SRA Decision”).
HHJ Simpkiss decided to lift the stay and ordered the Appellants to pay CRS’ costs of the application, namely £10,653. The reasoning of this decision was based principally on the fact that: (1) Mr Ashall had affirmed in a witness statement that Mr Middleton’s work in relation to the proceedings had been done ‘under my supervision’; (2) Mr Middleton had since been replaced by Lisa Adkin, a qualified solicitor; and (3) the SRA Decision had stated that section 21(3) of the Legal Services Act 2007 (“LSA”) entitled Mr Middleton to undertake reserved activities by virtue of his employment at a firm authorised and regulated by the SRA.
Ms Mazur and Mr Stuart appealed HHJ Simpkiss’ costs award on the basis that the judge had both erred on the effect of the LSA and exceeded his power to award costs in any event.
The Mazur decision
Sheldon J found for the Appellants on both of these points. With the benefit of intervening representations from the Law Society and the SRA itself, the Court held that Mr Middleton was not entitled to conduct litigation, even under the supervision of Mr Ashall.
The SRA – in the view of Sheldon J, correctly – disavowed the view expressed in the SRA Decision that section 21(3) permitted any unauthorised employee of an authorised person to conduct litigation. The judge held that the wording of section 21(3) itself does not justify such an effect, and that that position is inconsistent with the remainder of the LSA.
In fact, section 21(3) states that unauthorised employees of authorised persons count as ‘regulated persons’ for the purpose of section 21 more broadly. The implication of this is that employees such as Mr Middleton fall within the regulatory remit of the SRA (and other regulatory bodies). Section 21 does not, however, have the effect of authorising employees such as Mr Middleton to carry out reserved legal activities. That interpretation would conflate the concept of a ‘regulated person’ with that of an ‘authorised person’ where the LSA provides no basis for equating the two.
Indeed, the opposite is true. As Sheldon J pointed out, a number of provisions of the LSA make clear that an employee is not necessarily authorised by virtue of their employer’s authorisation. The definition of an ‘authorised person’ set out at section 18 of the LSA makes no mention of authorisation being delegated by an employer to an employee. By virtue of sections 14 to 16 of the LSA, an employer who is authorised to carry on a reserved legal activity can commit a criminal offence simply by virtue of their unauthorised employee carrying out that activity. The LSA framework, therefore, clearly does not consider an employer and employee to be functionally one and the same for the purposes of authorisation.
Importantly, an employee like Mr Middleton is still permitted to support an authorised person in the carrying on of a reserved legal activity. That much is contemplated by paragraph 1(7)(a) of Schedule 3 to the LSA. There is, however, no provision in the LSA for a category of persons who themselves conduct litigation under the supervision of an authorised solicitor. The distinction between cases of ‘support’ and ‘supervision’ will most likely be a matter of fact and degree in each instance, with key factors being who exercises the final professional judgement about how the litigation is conducted and who takes ultimate responsibility for that judgement. Given Sheldon J’s view on the proper interpretation of the LSA, HHJ Simpkiss’ costs award fell to be quashed in its entirety.[1]
Consequences of the judgment
As ever, the issues in this judgment give rise to some unfinished business. In particular, the question of the boundaries between an unauthorised employee supporting an authorised person in the carrying out of a reserved legal activity as opposed to conducting a reserved legal activity remains unclear. The boundaries of that distinction may well be tested – particularly if further guidance is not forthcoming.
This is not the first time that paralegals or legal executives have come under fire for potentially conducting litigation. Previous cases have explored the difficult distinction between conducting litigation and other permissible legal services. The starting point is the statutory definition of conducting litigation under Schedule 2 of the LSA, although that provides limited guidance on which specific actions might be considered conduct of litigation. The Court of Appeal in Ndole Assets Limited v Designer M&E Services [2018] EWCA Civ 2865 clarified that the performance of an administrative or mechanical function in connection with service of documents does not constitute the conduct of litigation. This can be distinguished from assuming legal responsibility for service. The claims consultants in Ndole were held to have assumed legal responsibility for service and were therefore (wrongly) conducting litigation.
This issue was most recently explored by the High Court in Baxter v Doble [2023] EWHC 486 (KB), in which Cavanagh J comprehensively reviewed the legal position on conducting litigation. The guidance given in Baxter was that “the court should look at the entirety of the activities undertaken […] and then decide whether, taken in the round, they amount to the conduct of litigation”. In that case, a legal executive was held to have conducted litigation by drafting pleadings, arranging for service of those pleadings, and making decisions about service, despite the fact that she was careful not to sign any pleadings or go on the record for the claimant.
This is a particularly tricky issue given that Baxter makes clear that even activities which do not amount to the conduct of litigation (such as inter partes correspondence and work done prior to commencement of proceedings) can contribute to the overall “impression” that the services provided amount to the conduct of litigation. The Court emphasised that substance must prevail over form – and practitioners should be careful to address the substantive change which needs to be made to comply with their legal obligations. Practitioners may also wish to review the SRA’s 2022 guidance on effective supervision which sets out a risk-based approach to appropriate supervision and quality control reviews.[2]
Particularly in the context of existing uncertainty about what constitutes the conduct of litigation, the decision of Mazur will have significant consequences throughout the legal industry. Four points are worth emphasising.
- First, many firms, particularly those focusing on ‘bulk litigation’, have for some time been reliant on a business model which involves unauthorised employees undertaking the lion’s share of the day-to-day work of drafting pleadings, claim forms and applications. Firms who have operated in that way will now need to redistribute their work and restructure their practices. Inevitably, that is likely to increase the cost of the work that was previously undertaken more cheaply by unauthorised employees. For some firms, their operation in certain existing markets may no longer be viable.
- Second, a large number of individuals who have themselves overstepped the limits of their authorisations, or have overseen others who have done so, will now feel obliged to self-report to the SRA. Given that the Chartered Institute of Legal Executives corrected its guidance on this matter in December 2023, and the SRA appears only recently to have understood the full implications of the rules, it is unclear what sanctions, if any, will be imposed.
- Third, parties will now almost certainly raise objections to work which has been undertaken by an unauthorised person in existing cases – the most obvious examples being where pleadings have been issued or signed by an unauthorised person. In Mazur, Sheldon J declined to strike out CRS’ claim because the problem of Mr Middleton’s involvement had been rectified and the Appellants had not suffered any prejudice as a result of the infraction. Other law firms may not be so lucky. Prompt response to the judgment and correction of internal practices could end up saving many otherwise doomed claims or defences and help avoid the imposition of wasted costs orders on infringing firms.
- Fourth, paying parties will now contend that the costs of work for a reserved activity undertaken by an unauthorised person should be disallowed – both between the parties but also between clients and solicitors. Paying parties will no doubt swiftly be deploying such arguments on costs assessments. Firms will be well advised to consider the terms of their existing retainers with clients and the way in which such work has been charged. As noted by the Senior Costs Judge at the Costs Law Reports Conference last week, such arguments are already in train[3].
The Law Society has now confirmed that it is seeking urgent engagement with the SRA to understand how it intends to respond to the case.[4] Quite surprisingly, no guidance has yet been provided by the SRA to address the fallout from Mazur. Practitioners would, for instance, welcome clarification as to the dividing line between conduct of litigation and purely ‘supportive’ work. In anticipation of such guidance, and in all likelihood thereafter, firms will have to tread carefully to ensure compliance with the LSA and to mitigate the risk of similar challenges to that in Mazur being raised in ongoing and future litigation.
At least in the short term, this is likely to increase the costs incurred by solicitors’ firms as more expensive, authorised fee-earners are forced to delegate less than they ordinarily would. That has concerning implications for the principle of access to justice. It will take firms time to adjust to and mitigate the negative effects of these changes.
© Matthew Waszak, Kelly Yu and Nicholas West, 4 New Square Chambers, September 2025
This article is not intended as a substitute for legal advice. Advice about a given set of facts should always be taken.
[1] Even so, Sheldon J held that the costs award was far beyond the maximum available to the Court in the circumstances. In light of the case’s provisional allocation to the Intermediate Track, it fell within Section VII for the purposes of CPR Part 45. Rule 45.8, in conjunction with Table 1, made clear that a fee of £333, along with an application fee of £303, was the extent of the possible costs recovery in this case. There was no indication here of the ‘exceptional circumstances’ required for the applicability of the exception to this rule under CPR r.45.9.
[2] https://www.sra.org.uk/solicitors/guidance/effective-supervision-guidance/
[3] Mazur ruling already being cited in court, senior judge reveals – Legal Futures
[4] https://www.lawsociety.org.uk/topics/civil-litigation/mazur-v-charles-russell-speechlys-litigators
