In a decision handed down on 30 June 2026 ([2026] EWHC 1604 (Admin)), Johnson J has overturned the decision of the BSB disciplinary tribunal to disbar Anurag Mohindru KC following a finding of dishonesty. This case is notable as a rare situation in which exceptional circumstances were found to apply to avoid the default sanction of disbarment, and where the Administrative Court has seen fit to overturn the sanction imposed by the Bar tribunal as both inappropriate and the product of material misdirection.
In this article, Benjamin Fowler and Tim Cochrane summarise the decision and its ramifications for this area of disciplinary law.
Background
Having taken a law degree following an academic and short professional background in medicine, Mr Mohindru was called to the Bar and 2004 and took silk in 2020, practising in criminal law. He had an exemplary professional record other than the matters addressed below.
In November 2012, Mr Mohindru was looking to move chambers. He was a keen cricketer and his application referenced this.
In February 2013, Mr Mohindru was invited to interview at a set specialising in criminal law. The interview included some informal questions about cricket. One interviewer wrongly thought – not based on anything Mr Mohindru had said or done – that Mr Mohindru had attended Oxford University. He was asked “did you get a blue?” – in other words, had he represented Oxford University in cricket at its annual varsity match against Cambridge University. Mr Mohindru understood the question and answered in the affirmative. This was dishonest.
The panel then asked Mr Mohindru to provide his CV. On 21 February 2013, shortly after the interview, Mr Mohindru submitted a CV to the chambers with the entry “Medicine, Oxford University 1993-1994”. This was false.
Mr Mohindru ultimately withdrew his application to that chambers and later applied to and joined another chambers; he did not repeat the false statements about attending Oxford University.
BSB complaint and investigation
On 5 August 2021, the BSB received an anonymous complaint about Mr Mohindru’s February 2013 conduct; Mr Mohindru believed that it originated from a solicitor with whom he had had a personal dispute who happened to be married to a member of the interview panel. Following an investigation, the BSB charged Mr Mohindru with disciplinary offences.
Mr Mohindru denied that he had made the false representations. He said during cross examination that a third party must have edited his CV which the BSB demonstrated by forensic evidence could not be correct.
Disciplinary Tribunal decision
On 7 October 2025, following a seven-day hearing, the tribunal found that Mr Mohindru had been dishonest in his statement during the interview and submitting the false entry in his CV thereafter. It held that no exceptional circumstances justified departing from the sanction of disbarment. In doing so, it held:
- The passage of time and his otherwise exemplary conduct were unrelated to the dishonesty and therefore as a matter of principle had to be disregarded.
- The defence run that other individuals might have altered his CV was a far more serious allegation of dishonesty than that which was charged against him.
High Court judgment
Mr Mohindru appealed the sanction to the High Court on various grounds. Mr Justice Johnson’s judgment focussed on three grounds arising directly from the tribunal’s reasoning quoted above. The court’s conclusions are summarised below.
Ground 1 – passage of time
On Ground One, the tribunal had interpreted too narrowly the statement in SRA v James that the exceptional circumstances “must relate in some way to the dishonesty itself”. The passage of time and Mr Mohindru’s exemplary reputation since the dishonest acts were of particular importance to the question of public confidence where the dishonesty was many years ago, in a particular context, at a very different stage of life, and show that he “cannot now be said to be a dishonest person”. The Court noted that the nature and extent of the dishonest act remains the primary consideration but other relevant factors should not be excluded.
Ground 2 – exceptional circumstances
In relation to Ground Two, the Court held that relevant factors had been disregarded and the exceptional circumstances test had been applied too literally. In particular, the Court had failed to take into account:
- The original lie was in response to a question which may – given the context including Mr Mohindru’s concerns about not being good enough or fitting the Bar stereotype – have caused him discomfort.
- The short period of time over which the dishonest acts were perpetrated, set in the context of a 20-year career.
- The absence of any finding that the lie was designed to improve his prospects of being offered tenancy (where a year at Oxford University was unlikely to be of material relevance given over 8 years of successful practice).
Ground 3 – reliance on the defence
The tribunal had misdirected itself by relying upon Mr Mohindru’s defence of the charge of dishonesty as an aggravating factor. This is a point that will be of particular interest to those defending disciplinary proceedings. In particular:
- First, it is correct that the mitigation that would flow from an admission would not be available if the charge is defended, but that is not the same as treating the defence of the claim as an aggravating factor (i.e. one which specifically militates against a higher sanction).
- Second, blaming others in a defence could not be considered an aggravating factor, notwithstanding the sanctions guidance that attempting to lay the blame elsewhere was a relevant factor. To be relevant, the attempt to blame others would have to have occurred “at the time of, or in the aftermath of, the misconduct”. There was no evidence that he had done so.
- In relation to this, it was significant that there was no finding that Mr Mohindru’s evidence that he did not recall altering the CV or that he believed it was fabricated by a third party was dishonest – the Court had therefore to conclude that this case was based on his honest belief as to what had happened.
As a consequence of the above, the Court allowed the appeal on the basis of material misdirections and errors of principle in the evaluation of sanction. It proceeded to determine the appropriate sanction, relying upon the matters detailed above, as well as the lack of harm, the absence of any gain or intention to secure a gain, that the dishonest acts did not relate to the conduct of legal services, dealings with money and did not constitute a criminal offence, and Mr Mohindru had been “greatly punished” through the public finding, suspension and consequential loss of income, as well as having to pay costs (circumstances at least in part consequential on the tribunal’s decision, and therefore unavailable to the tribunal when assessing the sanction).
Johnson J considered the appropriate sanction was suspension which had been served by the point of the judgment.
Conclusion
While the tribunals and courts have sought to stress that previous decisions have limited – if any – precedential value on their facts, there are a number of themes that can be traced through decisions where exceptional circumstances. These include ‘moments of madness’ where isolated acts of dishonesty which take place over a short time, have an impulsive quality, and cause no harm and generate no gain (see, for example, SRA v Roberts and Taylor v BSB, covered here, and the 20 April 2026 case of SRA v Chikwendu & Emuekpere). While Mr Mohindru’s case was not described as a moment of madness, it shares these qualities. In addition, the dishonesty in this case arose from a misunderstanding and an uncomfortable situation which was not of Mr Mohindru’s making. While the fact of an otherwise unblemished career is often relied upon in mitigation (see, for example, the March 2026 decision in SRA v Burdett) the substantial passage of time between the dishonest acts and the anonymous referral to the BSB was a particularly unusual factor in this case.
As in Taylor (where, in contrast to Mohindru, the High Court considered that the tribunal had applied the correct legal test but found that the suspension imposed was inappropriate and disproportionate), the focus of the assessment of must be on the nature of the dishonest acts but set in their proper context.
As a matter of principle, the case is a reminder of the need to apply sanctions guidance and judicial authority but to do so in a manner which is not overly narrow or literal, or which restricts detailed consideration of all the circumstances and how they are relevant to sanction.
© Benjamin Fowler and Tim Cochrane, 4 New Square Chambers, July 2026
This article is not intended as a substitute for legal advice. Advice about a given set of facts should always be taken.
